


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

ARMY review(s) completed.

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Information as of 1600

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HIGHLIGHTS

US forces engaged enemy units in Binh Dinh Province and ARVN forces continue to make contact with Viet Cong in the delta.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
At least 70 Viet Cong were reported killed by units of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division taking part in Operation THAYER II in coastal Binh Dinh Province (Para. 1). A total of 25 Viet Cong were killed by South Vietnamese forces in two separate actions in the Mekong Delta (Paras. 2-3). A six-battalion joint US and South Vietnamese operation named FAIR-FAX began on 1 December in the general area surrounding Saigon (Para. 4). A study of Viet Cong tactics in Operation ATTLEBORO reveals that the Communists had well-camouflaged bunkers and large stocks of ammunition, and that the usual mines and booby traps were not used (Paras. 5-6). Weekly review of South Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 7).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly has completed preliminary work on the constitution's chapters on the rights and duties of citizens (Para. 1).

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III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.


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V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

VI. Other Major Aspects: South Vietnamese shipping controls on the Mekong River are leading to POL shortages in Cambodia.

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Units of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division taking part in the four-battalion Operation THAYER II in coastal Binh Dinh Province engaged an enemy force of unknown strength early on 1 December. A one-platoon US patrol, later reinforced by three additional platoons, fought the Communist force for five hours and reportedly surrounded it. The latest casualty report was five Americans killed and 11 wounded compared to Communist losses of more than 70 killed.

2. Elements of South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) search-and-destroy Operation LONG PHI 994, presently being conducted in the delta province of Vinh Long, reported light contact with the Viet Cong on 30 November. Enemy losses reported since this operation began on 29 November are 17 killed, eight captured, ten suspects detained, and six weapons captured. ARVN casualties are three killed and 22 wounded.

3. In the southern delta province of Ba Xuyen, a South Vietnamese Regional Force company on a roadblock-clearing operation encountered a 40-man Viet Cong force. During a two-and-a-half-hour battle which was supported by two armed helicopters, eight Viet Cong were killed and two weapons captured. Friendly losses were five killed and five wounded.

4. Operation FAIRFAX, a coordinated six-battalion US - South Vietnamese search-and-destroy operation began on 1 December in the general area surrounding Saigon. Five Viet Cong battalions, with a strength of 1,400 men, are reported to be in the area of the operation. No contact with the enemy has been reported.

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Viet Cong Tactics in Operation ATTLEBORO

5. A study of Viet Cong tactics in Operation ATTLEBORO, which was conducted in Tay Ninh Province from 14 October to 25 November, indicates that the Communists were prepared with excellent camouflage, plenty of ammunition, and good discipline. This study by US military authorities reveals that Viet Cong bunkers were camouflaged with natural foliage--described as "almost perfect"--and American soldiers were unable to spot the bunkers until they were too close to use their grenade launchers. In this engagement the Communists used none of their usual mines, booby traps, and punji stakes.

6. Viet Cong withdrawals appeared orderly and well organized, indicating either excellent communications or good rehearsal and training exercises. Ammunition appeared to be plentiful and was used freely by the Viet Cong. Communist mortar fire was accurate.

Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

7. The week of 20-26 November compared with 13-19 November:

I. Viet Cong Incidents

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>At-tacks</u>	<u>Regimental size</u>	<u>Battalion size</u>
13-19 Nov	31	0	0
20-26 Nov	22	0	1

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Company size</u>	<u>Harassment</u>	<u>Terrorism</u>
13-19 Nov	2	358	32
20-26 Nov	0	350	33

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<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Sabo-tage</u>	<u>Propa-ganda</u>	<u>Anti-Aircraft</u>	<u>Total Incidents</u>
13-19 Nov	38	16	226	701
20-26 Nov	35	18	225	683

II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>13-19 Nov</u>	<u>20-26 Nov</u>	<u>13-19 Nov</u>	<u>20-26 Nov</u>
Killed	905	1,422	248	159
Wounded	---	-----	545	428
Missing/ Captured	<u>149</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>41</u>
TOTALS	1,054	1,555	870	628

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>13-19 Nov</u>	<u>20-26 Nov</u>	<u>13-19 Nov</u>	<u>20-26 Nov</u>
Killed	99	143	29	26
Wounded	747	703	73	51
Missing/ Captured	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTALS	846	848	102	81

III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>13-19 Nov</u>	<u>20-26 Nov</u>	<u>13-19 Nov</u>	<u>20-26 Nov</u>
Individual	256	Not	236	183
Crew-Served	<u>10</u>	Reported	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	266		246	183

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The Constituent Assembly has completed discussion of the rights and duties of citizens, and has approved a preliminary bill of rights containing 15 chapters. A 16th chapter governing limitations of those rights in time of national emergency was discussed, but put aside until debate on the legislative function of the elected government takes place. The precise wording of the statement governing military noninvolvement in politics is that "military personnel on active duty cannot join political parties or participate in the government." With the completion of the bill of rights discussions, the assembly was expected to proceed on 1 December with debate on what institutional form the future government will take.

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS

1. Cambodia is reacting sharply to South Vietnam's latest attempt to control shipping on the Mekong River.

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2. Cambodian officials [redacted] may ask the United Nations' Mekong Committee to bring pressure on Saigon to rescind recent regulations setting up a convoy system for ships bound for Phnom Penh. They held out the possibility that Cambodia may be forced to withdraw from the Mekong Committee unless normal ship movements on the river are resumed.

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3. Phnom Penh has long been extremely sensitive to indications that Saigon intends to interfere with its access to the open seas via the Mekong. Although Cambodia has another deep water port at Sihanoukville, its potential as a substitute for Phnom Penh is limited by inadequate dock space and an absence of petroleum storage facilities.

4. Cambodia has already experienced some economic dislocation because of delays caused by the convoy system. [redacted]

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[redacted] serious petroleum shortages are already being felt in the capital. [redacted] recommend that strict rationing be instituted by the Cambodian Government. The South Vietnamese Navy is presently considering a US request to the ruling Directorate asking for a relaxation of restrictions of POL deliveries to Phnom Penh.

5. Saigon began the convoy system in mid-November to curtail reported clandestine offloading of supplies for the Viet Cong. Similar, but less drastic controls were put in effect in late 1964, but apparently have not proved very effective. One of those controls, a ban on Mekong transit by ships coming from Communist ports, resulted in their diversion to Sihanoukville.

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6. So far there has been no public reaction from Sihanouk on this problem. If the economic repercussions of the new regulations become more serious, however, he will undoubtedly make strong representations. Cambodian officials have already indicated that they believe that the convoy system was inspired by the US to harass Cambodia.

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